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Summary 
This paper analyzes the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer 
from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our 
analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world economy 
comprising two regions, North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). As our model 
allows for labor mobility between the formal and informal sectors in the South, we are 
also able to capture additional aspects of how the transfer influences the Southern 
economy. In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the 
South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the 
welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the 
regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear 
to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern 
abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission 
reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement to an otherwise uncontrolled market 
economy, the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of international cooperation in order to address the climate problem is widely 
recognized. This is often exemplified by the Kyoto Conference of 1997, which resulted in a 
protocol with legally binding emission targets. The protocol sets binding targets for the 
industrialized countries (Annex I), while there are no such commitments for the developing 
countries (non-Annex I). A relevant question is how the climate policy can be implemented in 
a cost-efficient way in a world where only part of the countries faces explicit emission targets. 
The importance of cost-efficient implementation has been recognized by the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Art. 3.3., which states that the climate policy 
should “ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”. In practice, this means that, 
although the emission targets are imposed on a limited number of countries, there is some 
flexibility in the implementation of these targets which allows for a more cost-efficient 
outcome than would otherwise be accomplished. One way of increasing the cost-efficiency is 
to introduce technology transfers from Annex I to non-Annex I.
1 In addition, a technology 
transfer needs not (necessarily) only be a means of lowering the abatement cost; it may also 
contribute to economic growth in the host country. However, despite that the idea of 
technology transfers has received attention in the (academic as well as policy) discussion, it 
has so far only played a minor role in practice.
2 In the light of these observations, the purpose 
of this paper is to examine the welfare effects of technology transfers in terms of a numerical 
general equilibrium model. Our approach will be explained more thoroughly below. 
 
In the Kyoto protocol, the idea of technology transfers is formalized via the ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (CDM), allowing Annex I countries to invest in projects aimed at 
reducing the emissions in non-Annex I countries and, at the same time, relax their own 
emission targets in exchange for the emission reduction induced by these projects. The 
purpose of the CDM is “to assist parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the convention and to assist 
Annex I countries in reaching their targets”.
3 Earlier studies typically model the CDM in a 
way similar to emission trading.
4 However, this approach fails to recognize the first part of the 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Forsyth (1999) and Grubb (2000). 
2 See e.g.  Forsyth (1999). 
3 See Article 12 in the Kyoto Protocol. 
4 See e.g. Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux (1998) and Zhang (2001).   2
purpose of the CDM (to assist non-Annex I in achieving sustainable development). Another 
aspect of relevance for our analysis is that the ‘non-carbon welfare effects’ associated with the 
CDM are potentially very important for the non-Annex I countries, when they decide on 
whether or not to participate in projects aiming at lower emissions. In case studies focusing on 
Brazil, China and India, it is shown that these countries could benefit substantially from many 
viable abatement projects. The non-carbon benefits include, for instance, improved air and 
water quality, electrification of rural and remote areas, and increased employment.
5 
 
In this paper, we simulate the welfare effects of introducing a technology transfer in a stylized 
world-economy comprising two regions; the North (Annex I) and the South (non-Annex I). 
Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium, in which agents make intertemporal 
choices. The data and parameters for the regions are, to a large extent, based on the RICE- 
and DICE-models.
6 Clearly, the welfare effects of a technology transfer depend on the pre-
transfer resource allocation. We consider three different regimes; (i) the regions behave as 
uncontrolled (or imperfectly controlled) market economies – a regime which is also extended 
by allowing for the requirement of emission reductions in the North due to the Kyoto 
protocol, (ii) the pre-transfer resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, and 
(iii) the pre-transfer resource allocation is a conditional cooperative equilibrium, where 
‘conditional’ means that the resource allocation is decided upon in the absence of the option 
of using the transfer. The first two regimes are interesting in the sense of representing two 
extreme views on how the regions behave in the absence of cooperation. The uncontrolled 
market economy means that all externalities generated by each region remain uninternalized 
at the equilibrium, whereas the noncooperative Nash equilibrium implies that each region 
internalizes the externalities it imposes on the domestic residents (while the transboundary 
externalities remain uninternalized). Although the noncooperative Nash equilibrium appears 
to be the most common alternative to cooperation in earlier literature on international 
environmental policy, both these regimes have been addressed before in various contexts.
7 
Despite being unrealistic from a (current) practical policy perspective, the conditional 
cooperative equilibrium is interesting for purposes of comparison, as it allows the preferences 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Austin and Faeth (1999). 
6 See Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
7 For a more detailed discussion, see also the theoretical literature dealing with transboundary environmental 
problems; e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Tahvonen (1994), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003), 
Aronsson et al. (2004) and Aronsson et al. (2006).   3
of both the North and the South (and not just the North as in the other two regimes) to govern 
the decision underlying the use of the technology transfer. 
 
In addition to the distinction between the three regimes mentioned above, another novelty is 
that we divide the Southern economy in a formal and an informal sector, which is reasonable 
since the informal sector seems to play a much more important role in developing economies 
than in developed economies
8. This enables us to analyze the effects of labor mobility 
between the two sectors following a technology transfer. By assumption, the formal sector is 
more capital intensive than the informal sector and is characterized by higher average 
productivity. From the perspective of the North, the technology transfer is motivated by the 
difference in abatement costs between the regions. However, a technology transfer may also 
be thought of as an investment in a new and more efficient abatement technology, which 
might increase total factor productivity in the Southern formal sector. The issue of unilateral 
technology transfers from the North to the South was raised by Yang (1999). He considers the 
impact of such transfers in a dynamic general equilibrium model, where greenhouse gases 
give rise to a global externality. At the same time, the technology transfer in Yang’s model 
does not have any direct effects on the Southern economy other than a reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions; in other words, Yang did not address the productivity-oriented 
effect mentioned above. Another difference between Yang’s model and ours is that we allow 
the abatement cost differential between the regions to depend on the abatement efforts chosen 
by the South. Therefore, the benefits of a technology transfer from the North to the South 
depend on the level of abatement implemented by the Southern economy prior to the 
implementation of the transfer. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we present the basic structure of our 
numerical model. Section 3 describes the data as well as the ideas underlying the calibration. 
The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 gives the concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Numerical Model 
 
Consider a world economy comprising two regions, North (n) and South (s). The model to be 
described below is, to a large extent, based on the Rice-model developed by Nordhaus and 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Ihrig and Moe (2000).   4
Yang (1996) with the extensions mentioned in the previous section. The model is highly 
stylized and focuses on environmental interaction. To simplify the analysis, we follow earlier 
comparable literature by disregarding international factor mobility and trade (although we 
allow for labor mobility within the Southern economy, as mentioned above). This does not 
reflect a belief that international factor mobility and trade are unimportant; only that the 
underlying incentives are not easily captured by our model, which is designed to examine the 
effects of technology transfers from Annex I to non-Annex I. 
 
We use the following notations (neglecting the region-specific indicator); 
 
C Aggregate  consumption 
N Employment 
K Capital  stock 
c=C/N  Consumption per capita 
I Investments 
E CO2 emissions 
σ CO2 emissions per unit of output 
µ CO2 emission control rate (a measure of abatement) 
Tr Technology  transfer 
TE Atmospheric  temperature 
 
Let us begin by presenting the consumption part of the model. Each region is characterized by 
identical individuals
9 and a variable population. The objective function underlying public 
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j u  is the instantaneous utility function facing each resident and θ  the 
utility discount rate. Each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically at each point in 
time. By analogy to equation (1), the objective function underlying cooperative behavior is 
also utilitarian, i.e. 
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9 This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably. In the context of the South, it means that the 
representative agent earns part of his/her income from the formal sector and part from the informal sector. 
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The instantaneous utility function takes the Cobb-Douglas form 
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in which  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ ρ  is a fixed parameter and reflects the degree of concavity of the 
instantaneous utility function. 
 
Turning to the production structure, we assume that both regions are characterized by Cobb-
Douglas technologies. Despite this similarity, there are several differences between the 
regions. The production function for the North is written 
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n n n ζµ + =  represents the level of technology in period t, meaning that 
we allow for the possibility of ‘abatement driven’ technological change, and  ) (t A  is an 
exogenous time-dependent function. The expression  ( ) ] ) ( ) ( 1 /[ 1
2
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represents the production externality due to global warming. We will return to the 
assumptions about the fixed parameters
n γ ,  ζ , 
n
1 θ  and 
n
2 θ  below. The output net of 
abatement and transfer expenditures, which can be used for domestic consumption and net 
investments, is given by 
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in which  )) ( ( t Tr ω  is the cost of the technology transfer, whereas  ) ( 1 t
n α  and 
n
2 α  characterize 
the abatement technology available in period t. The expression within the brackets reflects 
the cost of abatement in terms of lost output, whereas the final term (the cost of the 
technology transfer) is determined by the abatement technology available in the Southern 
region in period t and is, therefore, dependent on the Southern abatement cost. This is 
described more thoroughly below. Capital formation is governed by 
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where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ δ  is the rate of capital depreciation. 
 
In the South, there is a distinction between the formal (f) and informal (i) sectors. The 
production functions are written 
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where 
s
f n  and 
s
i n  represent the share of the labor unit that each individual supplies to the 
formal and informal sector, respectively. The parameterization of equations (7) and (8) is 
analogous to that of equation (4). The technology function in equation (7), i.e. 
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reflects the idea that the technological change in the formal sector is driven both by domestic 
abatement (as in the North) and the technology transfer, whereas  ) (t A
s
i  in equation (8) is an 
exogenous and time-dependent technology function in the informal sector. The fixed 
parameter 0 > ζ  will be determined below. By analogy to the production structure in the 
North, the production externality is defined as  ( ) ] ) ( ) ( 1 /[ 1
2
2 1 t TE t TE t
s s s θ θ + + = Ω . Finally, the 
part of output used for domestic private consumption and net investments is given by 
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meaning that we allow for abatement efforts also in the South, although our reference case 
below is based on the assumption that the South does not abate. The capital formation in the 
two sectors is governed by 
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Let us now turn to the external effect. The total emissions of carbon dioxide are given by 
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where the three components on the right hand side (measuring emissions in the North, 
emissions in the formal sector in the South and emissions in the informal sector in the South, 
respectively) are defined as  
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The flow of carbon dioxide emissions in equation (12) gives rise to stocks of greenhouse 
gases in the air and water which, in part, determine how the temperature influences the output. 
This relationship is described in the Appendix A. 
 
3. Data Sources and Model Calibration 
 
Our model is mainly based on the data and parameters from the RICE-99 and DICE-99 
economic models of global warming.
10 From the original RICE-99-model with 13 regions, 
Japan, the U.S., Europe, other high income countries, Russia and Eastern Europe are 
aggregated into region North. The North can also be called ‘Annex I’, because it contains all 
countries that are subject to emission targets in the Kyoto protocol.
11 China, India, Africa and 
other low- and middle income regions are aggregated into the Southern region and can also be 
seen as the developing countries, which have made no commitments to reduce their 
emissions. The base year in our model is 1990, and the time horizon is 20 periods, where each 
period represents one decade. However, following Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we have 
chosen to present the equilibrium paths of some of the key variables during a shorter time 
                                                 
10 See Versions 020899, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage.htm. 
11 A list of the Annex I countries can be found in the Kyoto Protocol. Out of these 40 countries, only the U.S., 
Australia and Monaco had not yet ratified the Protocol on February 6, 2006.   8
period; more exactly, the first 13 periods (1990-2110). The welfare analysis for each of the 
three regimes is conducted by using all 20 periods. 
 
The possible gains for the North, from carrying out the technology transfer, depend on the 
preexisting level of abatement in the South (i.e. the level chosen prior to the technology 
transfer). The more domestic abatement the South has already accomplished, the higher will 
be the cost of abatement. In other words, the South has the opportunity to choose its domestic 
level of abatement before the North decides upon the technology transfer. This approach 
differs from Yang (1999); he assumes that the North has access to a given technology, which 
can be used either for domestic abatement or as a technology transfer, while the cost of the 
transfer does not depend on the current level of abatement in the South. However, from the 
perspective of the CDM, it is also interesting to consider situations where the South chooses 
to abate before the technology transfer is carried out. The reason is that it should not 
(according to the Kyoto protocol) be possible for the North to capture ‘low-cost’ abatement 
opportunities in the South, if there is a chance that the abatement project would have been 
implemented without the CDM.  
 
As we indicated above, another difference in comparison with earlier research is that the 
production in the South has been divided into a formal and an informal sector. It is a common 
feature that the informal sector is significantly larger in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. Estimates of the informal sector share of GDP in the developing 
countries average more than one third, while the corresponding share in the OECD is much 
smaller.
12 This leads to more uncertain estimates of the actual GDP in the developing 
countries. We assume that there is an additional ‘hidden’ informal sector of about one third of 
the production in the formal (observed) sector in the Southern economy. The informal sector 
is more labor intensive than the formal sector, and the average productivity is lower than in 
the formal sector. This implies that a movement of labor from the informal to the formal 
sector will most likely lead to higher output in the Southern economy. 
 
We calibrate the model in such a way, that the production in the Southern formal sector 
corresponds to the observed regional equivalent to GDP, and the industrial emissions of the 
South are equal to the observed emissions, at the beginning of the planning period. Note that 
                                                 
12 See Ihrig and Moe (2000).   9
the observed industrial emissions originate from the formal sector; this assumes that there are 
no large industries in the informal sector. However, there is also another source of emissions, 
which is treated as exogenous in the original RICE-99 and DICE-99 models. This source 
refers to land-use emissions, which mainly originate from the harvesting of forests in the 
developing countries. At present, these constitute about 20 per cent of the total emissions 
from the developing countries.
13 Realizing that a sector without large industries can be a 
significant source of emissions, we have chosen to transform the exogenous land-use 
emissions into endogenous emissions in the informal sector. In the reference case (see below), 
the informal sector emissions decrease over time in a way similar to the path for the 
exogenous land-use emissions in the original RICE-99 and DICE-99 models. The possibility 
to control emissions via investments in abatement technologies is assumed only to exist in the 
formal sector, which means that in order to change the path of the emissions in the informal 
sector, the size of the informal sector must be changed.  
 
The difference in marginal abatement costs between the regions motivates the transfer from 
the North to the South. In addition, as we indicated above, there may be an extra gain for the 
South associated with the transfer. This is recognized by allowing the total factor productivity 
(TFP) of the regions to depend on the emission control rate. For the Southern economy, both 
the domestic abatement and the technology transfer affect the TFP. The productivity effect 
associated with the technology transfer gives rise to labor mobility from the informal to the 
formal sector in the South. This implies increased output and possibly also higher emissions 
in the Southern formal sector. 
 
Our choices of parameter values are described in the Appendix B, and Section 4.4 contains a 
sensitivity analysis for some of these parameters (the parameters we have added by extending 
the original RICE-99 and DICE-99 models). 
 
4. Simulation results  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish between three different resource allocations 
prior to the introduction of the transfer; (i) the resource allocation is a weakly controlled (or 
uncontrolled) market economy, which in some of the calculations is extended to reflect the 
                                                 
13 See IPCC (2001).   10
emission targets in the Kyoto protocol, (ii) the resource allocation is a cooperative 
equilibrium, and (iii) the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in open-
loop form. The comparison to be carried out refers to the present value of future consumption 
in each region as well as at the global level; entities which are observable (or estimable) in 
practice. Note also that the three regimes only differ with respect to the environmental policy; 
we do not explicitly address other aspects of public policy. This enables us to concentrate the 
comparison to environmental policy aspects, which is in line with earlier, comparable, 
research. Equilibrium paths for key variables are presented in the Appendix C. Our reference 
case, by which the other regimes is compared, is the uncontrolled market economy, in which 
there is no policies to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. In each of the pre-transfer 
resource allocations described above, we present results from a baseline simulation, where the 
option of using the technology transfer is not available. Other simulations are based on the 
assumption that the size of the technology transfer is subject to choice (by the global social 
planner in the cooperative regime and by the North in the noncooperative regimes). We also 
relate the incentives of using the transfer to whether or not the South is carrying out domestic 
abatement. 
 
4.1 Imperfectly Controlled Market Economies 
 
The uncontrolled market economy is a projection of what would happen if no government 
intervention were used to slow down the global warming. Emissions are treated as a side 
effect of the production, meaning that the welfare effects of these emissions are not 
incorporated into the decision-problems. In this case, the global temperature increase (relative 
to the exogenous base temperature) by the year 2110 is simulated to be 2.463 degrees 
Celsius
14. The emission paths for each region can be seen in Appendix C (Figure 1). It is 
interesting to note that, within a few decades, the South will be the main emitter of carbon 
dioxide, while the simulated emission path for the North is relatively constant. However, in 
terms of emissions per capita, the South will not reach the level of the North during the whole 
simulation period.  
 
Table 1: Results:  Imperfectly Controlled Market Economies  
Here 
                                                 
14 The measure of temperature, degrees Celsius, is the temperature increase in period 13 compared to a base 
temperature level.   11
 
In order to address how the emission reductions implicit in the Kyoto protocol affect the 
resource allocation and consumption possibilities, the Kyoto restriction is implemented as a 
scenario where the North faces an emission constraint of stabilizing the emissions to 5% 
under the 1990 year level by the year 2008-2012 (period 3 in the model). The South is 
assumed not to take any actions to reduce its emissions. In our analysis, the Kyoto restriction 
imposed on the North holds during the remaining planning period. Given the Kyoto 
restriction, the temperature increase is estimated to be about 2.410 degrees Celsius, whereas 
the temperature increase in the uncontrolled market economy (our reference case) is 2.463 
degrees Celsius.  This confirms the finding of other studies that the Kyoto protocol will have a 
modest effect on the mean temperature level. If the option of using the technology transfer is 
not available (the second line in the table), the present value of consumption for the North is 




Opening up the possibility of using the technology transfer, this option will be used by the 
North from the period the Kyoto restriction becomes binding. As a consequence, the present 
value of future consumption increases for both the North and South relative to the case when 
this option is not available. Interestingly, the present value of future consumption facing the 
North actually becomes larger than in the uncontrolled market economy. By comparing the 
second and third rows in the table, we can see that the possibility of using the technology 
transfer implies a gain for the North of about 540 billion U.S. $.
16 As such, this gives an 
indication of the potential gains for the North of using the technology transfer. The gains for 
the South are mainly explained by increased output accompanied by labor mobility from the 
informal to the formal sector. The total increase in present value of future consumption for the 
South, compared to the case in which no transfer is used, is 43 billion U.S. $. This is partly 
due to the overall productivity gain (at constant employment shares) and partly to labor 
mobility. The additional gain associated with labor mobility is relatively small by comparison; 
                                                 
15 Recall that the North in our model comprises all Annex I countries; also the U.S., Australia and Monaco, 
which have not yet ratified the protocol. 
16 Since the size of the transfer depends on the abatement already implemented by the South, it is interesting to 
note that even if the South were to choose the same rate of emission control as in the Nash equilibrium (see 
below), it would still be in the North’s interest to use a positive technology transfer in order to reach the Kyoto 
target at minimum cost.   12
about 2-3 billion U.S. $.
17 The size of the technology transfer, given the emission reduction 
targets in the Kyoto protocol, is about 5 billion U.S. $ in the first period and 2 billion in the 
last period of analysis. As such, it only represents a small part of the wealth of the North, 
which is shown in the Appendix C (Figure 2). 
 
It is also interesting to compare the size of the transfer in our model during period 3 (which is 
the period when the Kyoto restriction becomes implemented) with the observed amount of 
resources spent on such climate projects in the developing countries during the time period 
1991-1997. Clearly, the size of the transfer implied by our model exceeds the observed 
amount of resources spent during that time period.
18 This may either imply that our model 
exaggerates the incentives to use the technology transfer, or that the Kyoto agreement creates 
incentives to increase the technology transfer.
19 
 
4.2 The Cooperative Equilibrium  
 
The cooperative equilibrium concept adopted here is based on the assumption that a global 
social planner maximizes the sum of the region-specific objective function subject to all 
restrictions described in section 2. This means that the marginal costs and benefits of emission 
control balance at the global level. It is the latter aspect of cooperation that we would like to 
capture; we are not assuming that the regions pool all their resources into one single resource 
constraint. 
   
Table 2: Results: Cooperative equilibrium 
Here 
 
In the baseline simulation, which does not allow for the technology transfer from the North to 
the South, the environmental policy is limited to the emission control rates for the two 
regions. Clearly, the present value of future consumption is higher in both regions than in the 
reference case (the uncontrolled market economy), and the temperature increase becomes 
2.098 degrees Celsius. 
                                                 
17 Although this effect appears to be small, note that it implies a movement of the equivalent of about 1-10 
million workers in each time period from the informal to the formal sector. 
18 See Michaelowa (2000). 
19 Transaction costs are often described as obstacles in the context of implementation of technology transfers. 
Our model does not include transaction costs.   13
 
Let us now turn to the second row of Table 2, where we introduce the option of using the 
technology transfer. Our results imply that this option will be used during the entire 
simulation period. This leads to an increase in the present value of future consumption at the 
global level. The optimal domestic emission control rates of the North and South do not 
change much in comparison with the baseline simulation. Therefore, by introducing the 
technology transfer, the emissions will be reduced. Note that the technology transfer makes 
the North worse off relative to the baseline simulation. However, the gain for the South 
outweighs the loss for the North; the implication in the table is that the present value of future 
consumption increases at the global level. Once again, the welfare gain of the technology 
transfer for the Southern economy is partly due increased productivity accompanied by labor 
mobility from the informal to the formal sector. However, the latter (productivity-related) 
effect only constitutes a small part of the total increase in the present value of future 
consumption for the Southern economy.  
 
If we impose the restriction that the emission control rate of the South should be equal to zero 
(the third row in Table 2), then the optimal size of the technology transfer increases relative to 
the previous simulation, where the Southern emission control rate is chosen freely by the 
global social planner. The emission control rate for the North does not change significantly, 
and the considerable size of the technology transfer brings the Southern industrial emissions 
near the level associated with the previous simulation. This means that the global social 
planner uses the technology transfer as an imperfect substitute for Southern abatement; the 
option of which is no longer available. The North becomes worse off, even in comparison 
with the uncontrolled market economy, while the South becomes much better off. The effect 
of labor mobility becomes more important when the Southern abatement is set to zero and 
amounts to about 25 billion U.S. $ in terms of its contribution to the present value of future 
consumption. The emission paths are shown in the Appendix C (Figure 3). Note that the 
emissions path of the North does not change significantly when the technology transfer is 
introduced; the most important effect is, instead, that the emissions of the South are reduced. 
 
The share of the transfer in the regional equivalent to GDP for the North is shown in the 
Appendix C (Figure 4), where we concentrate on the scenario giving the highest present value 
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of future consumption (the second row in Table 2). The cost of the transfer ranges from 0.15 
billion 1990 U.S. $ in the first time period to 17 billion U.S. $ in period 13, which is shown in 
the Appendix C (Figure 5). Our model implies a smaller technology transfer than found by 
Yang (1999)
20. Except that the North and South in our model do not include exactly the same 
countries as the corresponding regions in Yang’s model, one reason for a smaller technology 
transfer in our case is that the cost of the transfer depends on the level of domestic abatement 
implemented in the South. The larger the Southern emission control rate, the smaller the 
marginal abatement cost differential between the regions. Notice that these numbers for the 
transfer are based on the simulation, where the emission control rate of the South is positive. 
If, on the other hand, the emission control rate of the Southern economy is not a decision 
variable for the global social planner, the results change dramatically. In the latter case, the 
size of the transfer ranges from 2 billion U.S. $ in the first period up to 433 billion U.S. $, 
which is considerably higher than in the corresponding estimates by Yang. Therefore, in our 
model, the assumptions about which abatement policy options are available in the South are 
of considerable importance for the optimal size of the technology transfer. 
 
4.3 The Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium 
 
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium concept is based on the assumption that the resource 
allocation in each region is decided upon by a domestic social planner, who treats the policies 
chosen by the other region as exogenous. As a consequence, since each regional planner only 
considers the welfare facing the domestic residents, the domestic welfare effects associated 
with greenhouse gases will become internalized, whereas the transboundary external effect 
remains uninternalized. 
 
Table 3: Results: Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium 
Here 
 
Consider first the baseline simulation, where it is not possible to carry out the technology 
transfer. This means less emission control and a larger increase in the average temperature – 
2.192 degrees Celsius – than in the cooperative equilibrium. However, note that the difference 
in present value of future consumption between the cooperative equilibrium and the 
                                                 
20 The transfer in the corresponding scenario of Yang’s model ranges from about 1 billion to 80 billion U.S. $.   15
noncooperative Nash equilibrium is relatively small at the global level; the difference 
between, on the one hand, these two resource allocations and, on the other, the uncontrolled 
market economy is much greater. Therefore, if each region chooses its environmental policy 
in order to maximize its own welfare, while treating the actions of the other region as given, 
we may actually come relatively close to the global optimum. 
 
Now, consider the effects of introducing the technology transfer. If the South chooses its 
emission control rate in an optimal way, it is not in North’s interest to transfer technology to 
the South. Although the transfer increases the welfare at the global level, the North would 
become worse off. This is not surprising; the abatement carried out by the South reduces the 
abatement cost differential between the regions. If, on the other hand, the emission control 
rate of the South is restricted to be equal to zero prior to the introduction of the transfer, then 
the North will choose to make a transfer to the South; the abatement cost differential becomes 
much greater here than when the Southern emission control rate is subject to choice. 
However, the present value of future consumption becomes much smaller at the global level, 
indicating that Southern abatement is important from the perspective of global welfare. The 
industrial emissions in the cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative Nash equilibrium 
are shown in the Appendix C (Figure 6). 
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We have carried out sensitivity analyses for some of the parameters in the model. The 
sensitivity analyses refer to (i) the production functions in the South, (ii) the relationship 
between technological change and abatement, (iii) the ratio between emissions and output, 
and (iv) the production externality. We only discuss the qualitative results of these sensitivity 
analyses here. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
 
In the simulations presented in the main text, the parameter attached to the capital stock in the 
production function for the Southern formal sector, 
s
f γ , takes the same value as the 
corresponding parameter in the northern production function. These estimates originate from 
the RICE- and DICE-models. On the other hand, the parameter attached to the capital stock in 
the production function of the Southern informal sector, 
s
i γ , is smaller, which is motivated by 
the assumption of more labor intensive production. The first sensitivity analysis suggests the   16
qualitative results are not sensitive to small changes in 
s
f γ  and 
s
i γ ; the simulation results still 
imply a reallocation of labor from the informal to the formal sector in the South. Turning to 
the second sensitivity analysis, we find that the larger the productivity effect of abatement, i.e. 
the parameterζ , the larger will be the reallocation of labor between sectors in the South. 
Therefore, an increase in the parameter ζ  contributes to increase the effect of the technology 
transfer on the Southern economy. The third simulation eliminates part of the region-specific 
difference in the ratio between emissions and output. The qualitative results remain as they 
are in Tables 1-3. 
 
As mentioned above, we have also carried out a sensitivity analysis for the parameters in the 
damage functions associated with temperature increase, i.e. the production externality. In 
Tables 1-3, the damage facing the regions due to a temperature increase of 2.5 degrees Celsius 
is assumed to be of the order of 1 per cent of GDP for the North and 2 per cent of GDP for the 
South. These assumptions correspond closely with the original RICE and DICE-models. Our 
sensitivity analysis means that these effects are doubled. Interesting to note here is that the 
emissions chosen by each region are reduced substantially in comparison with those 
associated with the original model; for the North, the emissions are reduced well below the 
levels following from the Kyoto Protocol restriction. In the Nash equilibrium version of the 
model, the most important qualitative result remains unchanged; the North will not use the 




This paper deals with the consequences of introducing a technology transfer from the North to 
the South in the context of a numerical general equilibrium model. Our model comprises two 
regions, North and South, where the North represents the so called Annex I, or industrialized, 
countries in the Kyoto protocol, and the South represents the non-Annex I, or developing, 
countries. We distinguish between three different resource allocations prior to the introduction 
of the transfer; (i) the resource allocation is an otherwise uncontrolled market economy 
extended to reflect the emission targets in the Kyoto protocol, (ii) the resource allocation is a 
cooperative equilibrium, and (iii) the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium in open-loop form. 
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We find that a technology transfer from the North to the South, if designed appropriately, 
reduces the emissions and increases welfare at the global level. If the regions behave as Nash 
competitors prior to the introduction of the technology transfer, and although the transfer 
leads to higher welfare at the global level, the incentives of using this transfer appear to be 
week from the perspective of the North. The reason is that the abatement carried out by the 
South in our model tends to reduce the abatement cost differential between the regions. On 
the other hand, if we were to add the restriction that the South does not abate its own 
emissions, our results suggest that the North will, indeed, make a technology transfer to the 
South. The intuition is that the abatement cost differential (prior to the introduction of the 
technology transfer) becomes relatively large in this case. Therefore, if the industrialized 
countries are concerned with climate change, and the developing countries are only taking 
trivial steps to reduce their own emissions, our results suggest that it is in the interest of the 
industrialized countries to transfer environmental technology to achieve abatement in a more 
cost-efficient way. From the Southern perspective, the technology transfer may imply large 
benefits; both in terms of a better environment and in terms of technological change followed 
by a reallocation of resources from the informal to the formal sector. 
 
It is also interesting to analyze the role of the technology transfer in the context of a 
(hypothetical) cooperative equilibrium, as it implies that the transfer is governed by the 
preferences of the citizens in the North and the South. In this case, the (Utilitarian) global 
social planner would use the transfer instrument, because the welfare increase facing the 
residents in the South outweighs the welfare loss facing the residents in the North. The 
optimal policy implicit in the cooperative equilibrium implies abatement of the emissions 
originating from both regions and a technology transfer from the North to the South. 
 
Given the Kyoto Protocol, part of the Annex I countries has agreed to reduce the industrial 
emissions, while there are no such commitments for the developing countries. What role does 
the CDM play in combination with the emission reductions in the Kyoto Protocol? In the 
context of the reference scenario of our model, where the regions were uncontrolled market 
economies prior to the agreement, we have incorporated the Kyoto Protocol restriction along 
with the possibility for the North of using the technology transfer. Our results imply that the 
North will make technology transfers to the South in this case. In addition, although the Kyoto 
Protocol would be beneficial for the South even without the technology transfer, the use of the 
transfer contributes to increase the welfare in the South, partly by a reallocation of resources   18
from the informal to the formal sector. The productivity effect following the transfer can be 
seen as new employment opportunities in the formal sector, which is one of the non-carbon 
benefits often mentioned in the discussion of CDM-projects. Therefore, given the assumptions 
of which our model is based, the technology transfer may contribute to cost-efficient 
abatement from the perspective of the North and economic development in the South; let be 






MAT  Atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
MUP  concentrations in upper oceans 
MLO  concentrations in lower oceans 
TE  Atmospheric temperature change 
TLO  Oceanic temperature change 
F  Total radiative forcing 
O  Exogenous radiative forcing 
Ω Damage  function 
 
Following Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we have 
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Most parameters in our numerical model, including those presented in the Appendix A, 
originate from Nordhaus and Yang (1996). As our regions do not fully correspond to those of 
Nordhaus and Yang (who use a more disaggregated framework), the parameters in our model 
are weighted averages of those used by Nordhaus and Yang, where each weight is defined as 
the size of the underlying variable in each country in the original model relative to the size of 
this variable in our regional framework. Our model also introduces additional structure, and 
the new parameters are 
ρ = 0.8   γ
n = 0.3  γf
s = 0.3  γi
s
 = 0.1  ζ = 0.001  α2
n = 2.15   α2
s = 2.15 
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Table 4: Time varying parameter values 
Period
*  α1
n (t)  α1
s (t)  σ
n (t)  σf
s (t)  σi
s (t) 
1  0.170     0.130  0.205      0.546      0.670  
2  0.134     0.091     0.181      0.451      0.383     
3  0.107    0.067    0.162     0.390     0.233    
4  0.088     0.051     0.147      0.348      0.150     
5  0.073      0.040      0.135      0.316      0.101     
6  0.062 0.033 0.124 0.290 0.070 
7  0.053      0.028      0.115      0.269      0.051     
8  0.046      0.024      0.107      0.249      0.037     
9  0.041      0.021      0.101      0.230      0.028     
10  0.036      0.019      0.094      0.212      0.022     
11  0.033    0.017    0.089     0.193     0.017    
12  0.030 0.016 0.084 0.172 0.013 
13  0.027 0.015 0.079 0.149 0.010 
* Ten year periods 
 
The parameters associated with the CO2 emissions/output ratio (σ
n, σf
s) are calibrated such 
that the total emissions and temperature paths for the North and South in our baseline scenario 
closely tracks the corresponding paths in Nordhaus and Yang (1996). The emissions/output 
ratio for the informal sector (σi
s) is composed of the exogenous land use emission path from 
Nordhaus and Yang. The parameters of the cost functions (α1
n, α1
s) are calibrated such that the 
total emission reductions in our cooperative equilibrium correspond to the emission 
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Appendix C 
Figure 1.





































         
Figure 2.
Cost of the Technology Transfer, uncontrolled market 
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Figure 4.
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Table 1: Imperfectly Controlled Market Economies 
Scenario Tr  ∆Temp PVCN
  PVCS  PVCTOT
 
Reference case  - 2.463  -  -  - 
Kyoto 











Tr available   Yes 2.409  0.152  0.621 0.773 
*PVC is the present value of future consumption. Each such number is measured by 
comparison with the reference case, i.e. we subtract the number for the reference case. 
Trillion US 1990 $. 
 
 
Table 2: Cooperative Equilibrium 
Scenario Tr  ∆Temp PVCN
  PVCS  PVCTOT
 
Baseline, s µ  free  - 2.098  0.642  2.106  2.749 
Tr available, s µ  free  Yes 1.996  -0.219  2.991 2.773 
Tr available, 0 = s µ    Yes 1.990  -1.729  4.491 2.762 
*PVC is the present value of future consumption. Each such number is measured by 
comparison with the reference case, i.e. we subtract the number for the reference case. 
Trillion US 1990 $. 
 
Table 3: Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
Scenario Tr  ∆Temp PVCN
  PVCS  PVCTOT
 
Baseline, s µ  free  - 2.192  0.798  1.683  2.481 
Tr available, s µ  free  No 2.192  0.798  1.683  2.481 
Tr available, 0 = s µ    Yes 2.362  0.243  1.015 1.258 
*PVC is the present value of future consumption. Each such number is measured by 
comparison with the reference case, i.e. we subtract the number for the reference case. 
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